# 1NC

## 1

#### Agency discussions are essential to education about energy policy

Valentine 10 Scott Victor Valentine - Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, “Canada’s constitutional separation of (wind) power” Energy Policy, Volume 38, Issue 4, April 2010, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009227

Should policymakers facilitate renewable energy capacity development through distributive policies (i.e. subsidies), regulatory policies (i.e. CO2 emission caps), redistributive policies (i.e. carbon taxes) or constituent policies (i.e. green energy campaigns) (Lowi, 1972)? A preponderance of research has gone into addressing this question from various conceptual perspectives, which include popular themes such as comparing the efficacy of various policy instruments (cf. Blakeway and White, 2005; EWEA, 2005; Menza and Vachona, 2006; cf. Lipp, 2007), championing the efficacy of one specific instrument (cf. Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; cf. Mathews, 2008), assessing the impact that socio-economic dynamics have on the selection or design of policy instruments (cf. Maruyama et al., 2007; cf. Huang and Wu, 2009), investigating policy instrument selection in stakeholder networks (cf. Rowlands, 2007; cf. Mander, 2008), investigating hurdles to effective policy instruments implementation (cf. Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2002), and examining challenges associated with evaluating policy instrument efficacy (cf. Mallon, 2006; cf. Vine, 2008).

Despite the proliferation of studies on policy instruments in the renewable energy policy field, there are no prominent examples of studies which investigate the impact that the federal form of government has on strategic selection of policy instruments. Federal government systems are characterized by power-sharing between the central authority and the regions comprising the federation. For federal policymakers, the manner in which power is divided can pose significant policy-making problems (Thorlakson, 2003). Specifically, federal attempts to apply coercive policy instruments in policy areas of regional or concurrent (shared) authority can generate political, legal or operational resistance by regional authorities. Even when developing policy for areas under federal jurisdiction, regional authorities have to avail their various “thrust and riposte” tactics to undermine the efficacy of disagreeable federal policies (Braun et al., 2002). Given that there are 24 nations with a federal government structure (including the major economies of the United States, Germany, Canada, Australia, Russia, India, Spain, Brazil and Mexico), a formal enquiry into the impact that federal structure has on renewable energy policy instrument development is merited.

#### VI for limits and ground---hundreds of relevant actors, from the DoE to DOD, courts, executive all conduct different energy programs and have different restrictions ---overstretches our research burden and wrecks 1NC strategy.

## 2

#### Interpretation – The aff has to affect both resource extraction and conversion into energy

Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 2011 [“Energy Production and Consumption,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/national-greenhouse-energy-reporting/publications/supplementary-guidelines/energy-production-consumption.aspx]

Production of energy: in relation to a facility, means the:

1. extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility
2. manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility, or for use other than in the operation of the facility (regulation 2.23(3) NGER Regulations).

#### B. Violation – The plan only removes restrictions on extraction of natural gas and not production.

#### C. Reasons to Prefer

#### 1. Predictability –

Only our interpretation guarantees link arguments to both extraction and the burning of resources to produce energy. This is crucial link ground for pollution DAs and domestic/foreign energy tradeoff DAs.

#### 2. Limits –

Requiring the aff to both extract and convert the energy is necessary to eliminate affs that only extract, like capture carbon or methane or stockpile oil as a strategic military reserve with heg advantages. Also key to prevent affs that only burn fuels like Bataille-style affs that encourage rapid consumption or R&D affs that incentivize new ways to burn the same resources.

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for both Fairness and Educational reasons.

## 3

#### Obama wins – new jobs numbers

Silver 10-5 (Nate, statistician and election guru, 2012, “Jobs News Makes Obama’s Case Easier”, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/jobs-news-makes-obamas-case-easier/>) PY

The rate of jobs growth is now just slightly behind the [one that was enough to re-elect George W. Bush in 2004](http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/in-looking-back-four-years-voters-have-short-memories/), when an average of 168,000 jobs were created between January and September 2004.¶ Although the unemployment rate remains stubbornly high, the recent trajectory now looks more favorable. Unemployment has fallen by 0.7 percent since December 2011, to 7.8 percent from 8.5 percent.¶ Historically, there has been [no relationship at all](http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/on-the-maddeningly-inexact-relationship-between-unemployment-and-re-election/) between the unemployment rate on Election Day and the incumbent’s performance.¶ However, there has been a relationship between the change in the unemployment rate in the months leading up to the election and how well the incumbent does. The decline in unemployment under Mr. Obama this year since December is the largest in an election year since Ronald Reagan’s re-election bid, when it declined to 7.3 percent in Sept. 1984 from 8.3 percent in Dec. 1983.

#### 2. The campaign needs to stay on message – a move to the right on energy would split the base

Kemp 12 (John Kemp, Reuters market analyst, 8-24-12, COLUMN-Romney, Obama both evade key energy issues: Kemp. http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/24/column-kemp-energy-us-vote-idINL6E8JO9SC20120824)

U.S. presidential candidates Mitt Romney and Barack Obama have offered starkly different visions for the future of energy in North America.¶ Energy has become a crucial issue in the 2012 presidential and congressional campaigns.¶ For all the time being spent discussing energy issues, however, neither campaign is being completely honest about the choices ahead.¶ The president emphasises his support for a comprehensive strategy that embraces all potential sources of energy. But he remains reluctant to admit that emissions-creating fossil fuels will still play a major role - a fact many of his most ardent supporters in the environmental movement find uncomfortable.¶ Romney's campaign is more open about the need for more exploration and drilling but does not seem to have any idea about how to promote renewables or curb greenhouse-causing emissions.¶ It would be nice to think some of these difficult choices will be explored on the campaign trail before the voters have to make their final choice. But a degree of ambiguity is useful to both campaigns, which suggests voters will be left in the dark about what either candidate would actually do on crucial aspects of energy policy.¶ RIVAL PLANS¶ Speaking in New Mexico on Thursday, Romney promised to make energy independence for North America by 2020 a national goal.¶ To achieve it, the Republican outlined a five-point programme including giving responsibility for issuing drilling permits on federal lands to state governments to cut delays as well as a five-year leasing programme for offshore exploration including off the coasts of the Carolinas, Virginia and the U.S. Gulf.¶ Romney also promised to create an energy partnership with Canada and Mexico to fast-track the approval of infrastructure, starting with the controversial Keystone XL oil pipeline; an accurate inventory of national energy resources; and changes in regulatory processes to ensure energy projects are approved where needed and that the process is not used to stop energy production.¶ The Romney campaign has framed energy squarely as an economic issue. Energy independence features prominently as the first element in Romney's "plan for a stronger middle class", which promises to secure more jobs and more take-home pay.¶ In contrast, the Obama campaign twins energy issues with the environment. The president's website emphasises his administration has made protecting the environment a priority, while insisting his "all of the above" strategy means "never having to choose between protecting our environment and strengthening our economy".¶ Obama's campaign claims policies to promote investment in clean energy "have helped create hundreds of thousands of jobs". Investment in clean technology is promoted as a way to spur a high-tech manufacturing revolution.¶ AWKWARD SILENCE¶ Both campaigns are keen to highlight their energy policies (though Republicans seem markedly more enthusiastic than Democrats). But neither side is entirely comfortable talking about the subject, and both prefer to keep quiet about some of the difficult tradeoffs it presents.¶ The Romney campaign wants to focus on the potential for increased oil and gas production to boost the economy and national security, if only the federal government would step out of the way.¶ For Romney, energy policy unifies all aspects of the Republican base: pro-business groups, small-government conservatives and the national security lobby. It usefully divides Democrats, pitting environmentalists against unions and workers in energy-intensive sectors such as steel, cement, coal and transport.¶ Divisions within the Democratic Party were on display when large numbers of legislators from coal and industrial states voted against emission curbs and again when many Democrats from oil and gas-producing states and conservative-leaning districts rebelled against the president's decision to block Keystone.¶ But the Romney campaign is less candid about what producing all this extra oil and gas would mean for global warming. It would almost certainly leave clean energy technologies such as wind and solar struggling to compete, especially since Romney has pledged to oppose the renewal of subsidies, and Republicans remain hostile to cap and trade and other forms of carbon pricing.

#### 3. Even tiny shifts matter – our link is low threshold and linear

Silver 12 (Nate, 5/15, chief pollster for New York Times’ 538 election polling center. Regarded as top-level pollster based on distinct mathematical models http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/a-30000-foot-view-on-the-presidential-race/)

The last thing to remember is that when an election is quite close, it does not take very much to shift the race from one candidate being a 60/40 favorite to it being about even.¶ At the betting market Intrade, Mr. Obama’s odds of re-election have consistently been around 60 percent. While, on the one hand, it is good not to overreact to new data at this early stage of the race, it is also worth remembering that even a one-point shift in a president’s approval ratings, or a modest change in the economic forecasts, can move a president’s re-election odds at the margin.

#### 4. Romney will bomb Iran

Tilford 12 (Robert, Military Affairs writer for the ExaminerAugust 25th, “Romney promises the American people war if elected” http://www.examiner.com/article/romney-promises-the-american-people-war-if-elected)

U.S. presidential candidate from the Republican Party Mitt Romney is promising the American people war if elected.¶ Romney told CBS news he'd be willing to go to war to stop Iran from "becoming nuclear” (see article: Romney Ready to Invade Syria, Strike Iran's Nuclear Program http://www.novinite.com/view\_news.php?id=142607 ).¶ "No question in my view that we can put all manner of pressure on the regime that's there, but they have to also know that a military option is one which we'd be willing to consider if they do not take action to dissuade a course towards nuclearization," Romney said of Iran.¶ On Face the Nation on Sunday, Mitt Romney said that if elected president “he wouldn't have to get congressional permission for a military strike on Iran” – which, of course would violate the U.S. Constitution.

#### 5. Iran strikes causes multiple scenarios for nuclear war, CBW use and terrorist attacks.

Russell 9 (James A. Russell, managing editor of Strategic Insights, the quarterly ejournal published by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 2009, Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East, Security Studies Center)

Iran’s response to what would initially start as a sustained stand-off bombardment (Desert Fox Heavy) could take a number of different forms that might lead to escalation by the United States and Israel, surrounding states, and non-state actors. Once the strikes commenced, it is difficult to imagine Iran remaining in a Saddam-like quiescent mode and hunkering down to wait out the attacks. Iranian leaders have unequivocally stated that any attack on its nuclear sites will result in a wider war81 – a war that could involve regional states on both sides as well as non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. While a wider regional war need not lead to escalation and nuclear use by either Israel or the United States, wartime circumstances and domestic political pressures could combine to shape decision-making in ways that present nuclear use as an option to achieve military and political objectives. For both the United States and Israel, Iranian or proxy use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons represent the most serious potential escalation triggers. For Israel, a sustained conventional bombardment of its urban centers by Hezbollah rockets in Southern Lebanon could also trigger an escalation spiral. Assessing relative probability of these scenarios is very difficult and beyond the scope of this article. Some scenarios for Iranian responses that could lead to escalation by the United States and Israel are: Terrorist-type asymmetric attacks on either the U.S. or Israeli homelands by Iran or its proxies using either conventional or unconventional (chemical, biological, or radiological) weapons. Escalation is more likely in response to the use of unconventional weapons in populated urban centers. The potential for use of nuclear retaliation against terrorist type attacks is problematic, unless of course the sponsoring country takes official responsibility for them, which seems highly unlikely. Asymmetric attacks by Iran or its proxies using unconventional weapons against U.S. military facilities in Iraq and the Gulf States (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar); • Long-range missile strikes by Iran attacking Israel and/or U.S. facilities in Iraq and the Gulf States: • Conventional missile strikes in and around the Israeli reactor at Dimona • Airbursts of chemical or radiological agents in Israeli urban areas; • Missile strikes using non-conventional weapons against US Gulf facilities such as Al Udeid in Qatar, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, and the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain. Under all scenarios involving chemical/biological attacks on its forces, the United States has historically retained the right to respond with all means at its disposal even if the attacks come from a non-nuclear weapons state.82 • The involvement of non-state actors as part of ongoing hostilities between Iran, the United States, and Israel in which Hezbollah and/or Hamas became engaged presents an added dimension for conflict escalation. While tactically allied with Iran and each other, these groups have divergent interests and objectives that could affect their involvement (or non-involvement in a wider regional war) – particularly in ways that might prompt escalation by Israel and the United States. Hezbollah is widely believed to have stored thousands of short range Iranian-supplied rockets in southern Lebanon. Attacking Israel in successive fusillades of missiles over time could lead to domestic political demands on the Israeli military to immediately stop these external attacks – a mission that might require a wide area-denial capability provided by nuclear weapons and their associated PSI overpressures, particularly if its conventional ground operations in Gaza prove in the mid- to longterms as indecisive or strategic ambiguous as its 2006 operations in Lebanon. • Another source of uncertainty is the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – referred to here as “quasi-state” actor. The IRGC manages the regime’s nuclear, chemical and missile programs and is responsible for “extraterritorial” operations outside Iran. The IRGC is considered as instrument of the state and reports directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. So far, the IRGC has apparently refrained from providing unconventional weapons to its surrogates. The IRGC also, however arms and funds various Shiite paramilitary groups in Iraq and Lebanon that have interests and objectives that may or may not directly reflect those of the Iranian supreme leader. Actions of these groups in a wartime environment are another source of strategic uncertainty that could shape crisis decision-making in unhelpful ways. • The most likely regional state to be drawn into a conflict on Iran’s side in a wider regional war is Syria, which is widely reported to have well developed missile and chemical warfare programs. Direct Syrian military involvement in an Israeli-U.S./Iranian war taking the form of missile strikes or chemical attacks on Israel could serve as another escalation trigger in a nuclear-use scenario, in particular if chemical or bio-chem weapons are used by the Syrians, technically crossing the WMD-chasm and triggering a retaliatory strike using any category of WMD including nuclear weapons. • The last – and perhaps most disturbing – of these near-term scenarios is the possible use by Iran of nuclear weapons in the event of conventional strikes by the United States and Israel. This scenario is built on the assumption of a U.S. and/or Israeli intelligence failure to detect Iranian possession of a nuclear device that had either been covertly built or acquired from another source. It is possible to foresee an Iranian “demonstration” use of a nuclear weapon in such a scenario in an attempt to stop an Israeli/U.S. conventional bombardment. A darker scenario would be a direct nuclear attack by Iran on Israel, also precipitated by conventional strikes, inducing a “use them or lose them” response. In turn, such a nuclear strike would almost certainly prompt an Israeli and U.S. massive response – a potential “Armageddon” scenario.

## 4

#### The Department of the Interior should issue a guidance document substantially reducing the enforcement of restrictions on offshore natural gas production.

#### The Department of Interior can open up new land to drilling – Alaska proves

Reuters 12 (DOI proposes new development, protections in Arctic, August 13th, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-13/business/sns-rt-us-alaska-explorationbre87d01p-20120813\_1\_lease-sale-national-petroleum-reserve-alaska-protections)

ANCHORAGE, Alaska (Reuters) - The Department of Interior on Monday proposed a mixture of new oil and gas development and environmental protections in a vast swathe of Arctic land.¶ The department said its preferred alternative for managing the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska calls for about half of the Indiana-sized land unit to be opened to oil and gas leasing. Other areas important to polar bears, seals, migratory birds and other wildlife would be protected from development.¶ The proposed plan was welcomed by environmental activists but drilling supporters said they were unhappy.¶ "What we want to do is make sure that we don't mess it up," Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said at an Anchorage news conference.¶ The 11.8 million acres that would be available for leasing hold an estimated 549 million barrels of economically recoverable oil and 8.7 trillion cubic feet of economically recoverable natural gas, according to the Department of Interior.¶ It also allows for a pipeline to cross the reserve - even in designated protected areas - should commercial quantities of oil be discovered in offshore areas of the Chukchi Sea, Salazar said. Oil from the Chukchi would have to be transported overland to the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, he said. No pipeline route is selected, and details about a pipeline would be subject to future analysis, he said.¶ Selection of a preferred alternative comes nearly four months after the BLM issued a draft management plan for the petroleum reserve. The draft plan was the first document issued by any government agency to outline a management strategy for the entire 23 million acre reserve, Salazar said. A final plan is expected to be issued later this year, he said.

#### Guidance documents avoid elections- especially true in divided government

Raso 10 [Connor N. J.D., Yale Law School expected 2010; Ph.D., Stanford University Department of Political Science expected 2010 “Note: Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents” The Yale Law Journal January, 119 Yale L.J. 782]

Agency leaders facing a Congress and President in agreement on their issue area have a relatively simple means of minimizing political pressure: obey their political principals. This is not to suggest that agencies hold no discretion during unified government. 100 Nonetheless, agencies hold greater slack when Congress and the President are divided. This situation is more likely when different political parties control the two branches. 101 Such division increases the cost of issuing a legislative rule. By contrast, a guidance document is less likely to draw the attention of Congress and the President because it is exempt from the numerous procedural requirements that alert the political branches to agency rulemakings. 102 In short, this Note argues that the advantage of avoiding this attention increases when Congress and the President are divided because the agency cannot please both of its superiors.

## 5

#### The rapacious drive to secure energy is a symptom of “challenging-forth,” a mindset that renders everything as disposable. Only through rejecting challenging forth and embracing bringing forth can we avoid this hollowing out of Being. Questions of ontology have to come first.

Waddington 5 A Field Guide to Heidegger: Understanding 'The Question concerning Technology' more by David Waddington Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2005 http://concordia.academia.edu/DavidWaddington/Papers/538046/A\_Field\_Guide\_to\_Heidegger\_Understanding\_The\_Question\_concerning\_Technology

Most essays on technology focus primarily on practical issues surrounding the use of particular technologies . Heidegger’s essay, however, does not—instead, it focuses on the ways of thinking that lie behind technology. Heidegger (1977, p. 3) thinks that by coming to understand these ways of thinking, humans can enter into a ‘free relationship’ with technology. After dismissing the conventional account of technology, which supposedly states that technology is simply a means to an end, Heidegger commences a discussion on ancient craftsmanship. He suggests that the ancient craftsmanship involves the four Aristotelian causes: material, formal, ﬁnal, and efﬁcient. Intuitively, one might think that the efﬁcient cause of a given craft-item (the craftsman) was the most signiﬁcant of the four. However, although the craftsman has an important role in that she unites the four causes by considering each of them carefully, each of the four causes is equally co-responsible for the particular craft-item that is produced. Heidegger comments, ‘The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into presencing’ (1977, p. 9). Appropriately enough, Heidegger names this process bringing-forth . Notably, bringing-forth is not merely a descriptive genus under which the four causes are subsumed—rather, it is a uniﬁed process, ‘a single leading-forth to which [each of the causes] is indebted’ (Lovitt, 1972, p. 46).Heidegger writes that bringing-forth ‘comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment’ (1977, p. 11). Thus, instead of the craft-item being created by the craftsman, as one would think, it was revealed or unconcealed .In ‘The Thing’, Heidegger comments on the making of a jug, The jug is not a vessel because it was made; rather, the jug had to be made because it is this holding vessel. The making … lets the jug come into its own. But that which in the jug’s nature is its own is never brought about by its making. (1971, p. 168)Clearly, revealing/unconcealing in the mode of bringing-forth contains strong hints of Platonism. Bringing-forth is the mode of revealing that corresponds to ancient craft. Modern technology, however, has its own particular mode of revealing, which Heidegger calls challenging-forth . Thinking in the mode of challenging-forth is very different from thinking in the mode of bringing-forth: when challenging-forth, one sets upon the elements of a situation both in the sense of ordering (i.e. setting a system upon) and in a more rapacious sense (i.e. the wolves set upon the traveler and devoured him). In bringing-forth, human beings were one important element among others in the productive process; in challenging-forth, humans control the productive process. Efﬁciency is an additional important element of thinking in the mode of challeng-ing forth; the earth, for example, is set upon to yield the maximum amount of ore with the minimum amount of effort. Essentially, challenging-forth changes the way we see the world—as Michael Zimmerman pointedly remarks, ‘To be capable of transforming a forest into packaging for cheeseburgers, man must see the forest not as a display of the miracle of life, but as raw material, pure and simple’ (1977, p. 79).Production in the mode of challenging-forth reveals objects that have the status of standing-reserve . Objects that have been made standing-reserve have been reduced to disposability in two different senses of the word: (1) They are disposable in the technical sense; they are easily ordered and arranged. Trees that once stood chaotically in the forest are now logs that can be easily counted, weighed, piled, and shipped. (2) They are also disposable in the conventional sense; like diapers and cheap razors, they are endlessly replaceable/interchangeable and have little value. For the most part, challenging things forth into standing-reserve is not a laudable activity, and thus it makes sense to wonder what drives human beings to think in this way. Heidegger’s answer to this motivational question is unconventional— instead of suggesting that the origins of this motivation are indigenous to human beings, he postulates the existence of a phenomenon that ‘sets upon man to order the real as standing-reserve’ (1977, p. 19). Heidegger calls this mysterious phenomenon enframing ( Ge-stell in German). The word ‘Ge-stell’ gathers together several meanings of the -stellen family of German verbs: in Ge-stell, humans are ordered ( bestellen ), commanded ( bestellen ), and entrapped ( nachstellen ) (Harries 1994,p. 229). Heidegger thinks that our default state is that of being trapped by Ge-stell; this is what he means when he writes, ‘As the one who is challenged forth in this way, man stands within the essential realm of [Ge-stell]. He can never take up a relationship to it only subsequently’ (1977, p. 24; Sallis, 1971, p. 162). According to Heidegger (1977, p. 25), there are different ‘ordainings of destining’ for human beings. Although the default destining is that of Ge-stell, it is possible to choose an alternate road. Heidegger thinks that human beings have been granted the special role of ‘Shepherds of Being’—we have been granted the power to reveal the world in certain ways (Ballard, 1971, p. 60). Trapped in Ge-stell, we tend to reveal things in the mode of challenging-forth, but we can also choose to reveal things in the mode of bringing-forth. Heidegger comments, ‘Placed between these possibilities, man is endangered from out of destining’ (1977, p. 26). However, by carefully considering the ways of thinking that lie behind technology, we can grasp the ‘saving power’. We can realize that we, the Shepherds of Being, have a choice : we can bring-forth rather than challenge-forth. Thus, once we understand the thinking behind technology, we become free to choose our fate—‘… we are already sojourning in the open space of destining’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 26).

## Case

### Solvency

#### Too soon to invest in natural gas—no stable market and no short-term profit sustainability

Barone 6/27/12 (Writer for Forbes, "Way Too Soon to Get Into Natural Gas" [www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/06/27/way-too-soon-to-get-into-natural-gas/](http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/06/27/way-too-soon-to-get-into-natural-gas/), TGA)

While Mr. Gundlach’s trade is quite interesting, it seems a bit risky, or at least too early. If natural gas prices return to the $5 to $7 MMBtu range, the demand coming from the power industry could be short lived, as it could then be more economical to retrofit power generating units back to coal usage. Coal also has the advantage of having a fixed set of rules and regulations that the EPA enforces, while there remains a lot of uncertainty around what the future fracking regulations will be. Furthermore, demand from autos and trucks, or from LNG export is still in the talking phase. Little investment has yet been made. The fundamental demand and supply features of the trade are just not there, especially in the short-run. One only needs to look at Chesapeake Energy (CHK) and its mounting debt and management issues to see the sector is not sound. While I believe that Devon Energy (DVN) and XTO Energy, which was purchased by ExxonMobil, are well managed I would not be a buyer at this point based on their current profit margins. We also would not be buyers of midstream infrastructure operators either, which is where Mr Gundlach’s mutual fund DoubleLine Multi-Asset Growth Fund (DMLAX) is looking at making purchases.

#### Plan does not get rid of all the restrictions that are killing natural gas in the SQUO. That’s necessary according to their Hagerty ev.

#### Prices will inevitably skyrocket

Finger 7/22/12 (Richard, Forbes, “We’re Headed to $8 Natural Gas,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2012/07/22/were-headed-to-8-00-natural-gas/>, TGA)

There is a glut of natural gas. Everybody knows that. There’s so much of the latest multi stage hydraulic fracturing going on from New York State to Texas and all places in between, prices will be low forever. But just as a full watering hole can deplete quickly the current gas storage glut can recede. If fact it already has been and at an alarmingly brisk pace and there may be a confluence of other events which could hasten the process. Consider this. The weekly EIA natural gas storage numbers reported each Thursday came in with a 28 billion cubic feet (bcf) injection. The inventory increase last year at this time was 67 bcf while the five year average accretion was 74 bcf. So true that one week does not a trend make. But this makes eleven straight weeks that have experienced below average storage injections. After Thursday’s numbers were released inventories stood at 3.163 Trillion Cubic Feet or 19.2% above last year but only 17.5% above the five year average. A seemingly decent cushion until you consider as recently as May 10 stockpiles were 48.4% and 49.9% ahead of the previous year and the five year averages respectively. So the question becomes, why are rates of gas injection dropping so precipitously unless the shale plays are actually unable to produce the necessary incremental volumes.

### Prices

#### Growth high now—housing, energy, banking, industrial base, and deficit reduction by the end of the year—history proves

Altman, former US deputy Treasury secretary, 9/3

(9/3/12, Roger Altman is founder and chairman of Evercore Partners and a former US deputy Treasury secretary, “The US economy may surprise us all”, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f7ec3e66-f5ac-11e1-bf76-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25j9wVhop>)

But when they do, it is possible that the US economy will surprise on the upside. A housing revival, the revolution occurring in energy, a rejuvenated banking system and a leaner industrial base could lead to US growth beyond the 2.5 per cent rate that is widely seen as its long-term potential. In other words, the famine could be followed by a feast. There are precedents for such a growth spurt. We saw it in the recovery from the deep 1981-82 recession and over the latter half of the 1990s. True, those periods were not preceded by a financial collapse. But they did not involve a monetary response as powerful as that unleashed by the US Federal Reserve in 2008 and 2009. There are now serious forecasts, for example from the International Monetary Fund and The Conference Board, which suggest the annual growth rate may reach 3-4 per cent within five years. There are five factors that suggest there could be a surge in US growth. First, the housing sector is improving. Between 1980 and 2005 it accounted for an average 4.5 per cent of gross domestic product and before the crash it employed more than 3m Americans. But in 2012 it represents only 2.4 per cent of GDP and 2m jobs. Almost 1.5m mortgages are still in foreclosure. But the first signs of renewal have appeared: prices are rising in almost half of the country’s major housing markets. Pent-up demand is huge. Goldman Sachs expects housing starts to hit 1.4m annually by 2015, up from 700,000 this year. After 2015, the total will rise further and boost GDP, as household formation rates and the starts-to-population ratio revert to historical norms. The second cause for optimism is the breathtaking increase in oil and gas production. Data from the US Energy Information Administration support this. Natural gas output reached an all-time high this year, with shale gas accounting for half of it. On the oil side, US production fell 48 per cent from its 1970 high to only 5m barrels a day in 2008. Driven by shale, it is up almost 20 per cent from 2008 to 2012. IHS Cera, a research group, projects that oil production will rise another 3m b/d and reach a new high by 2020. Within five years, the oil gains alone could add more than 1 percentage point to annual GDP growth and up to 3m jobs. The fall in natural gas prices will reduce the average utility bill by almost $1,000 a year. It will also reinvigorate the US petrochemical industry and some manufacturing sectors. Third, amid the political controversy and negative publicity, the US banking system has recovered faster than anyone could have imagined. Capital and liquidity have been rebuilt to levels unseen in decades. Legacy mortgage problems are fading. Profits are very strong. Lending is growing quickly: total bank credit outstanding now stands at $9.8tn, according to Fed data, a record high. The proportion of bank lending going to business will next year probably reach a record level. Fourth, the US has made a huge leap in industrial competitiveness. Unit production costs are down 11 per cent over the past 10 years, while costs have risen in almost every other advanced nation. The differences in labour costs compared with China are narrowing. Consider the automotive sector. In 2005, Detroit’s hourly labour costs were 40 per cent higher than at US plants owned by foreign carmakers, according to research by Evercore Partners. Today these costs are virtually identical and the big three carmakers have regained market share. Furthermore, personal savings rates are up to 4 per cent – from near zero before the crisis – and are expected to stabilise. This will spur higher levels of private investment and even further productivity gains. Finally (and more speculatively), the US may surprise itself and the world by rectifying its deficit and debt problems. If Barack Obama is re-elected, he may allow the George W. Bush tax cuts to expire at the end of 2012. That step could force Congress to the negotiating table and produce a large, balanced deficit-reduction programme that would boost confidence, the stock market and private investment

#### No chance of a recession – we’re in the clear.

Roubini, doctorate in international economics at Harvard University, ‘12

[Nouriel, receiving a BA in political economics at Bocconi University, he became an academic at Yale and a practicing economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Federal Reserve, World Bank, and Bank of Israel. Much of his early research focused on emerging markets. During the administration of President Bill Clinton, he was a senior economist for the Council of Economic Advisers, later moving to the United States Treasury Department as a senior adviser to Timothy Geithner, who in 2009 became Treasury Secretary, and Ian Bremmer, “$200 Oil and the Moscow-Beijing Alliance,” 3/7/12, Foreign Policy,

ttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/09/200\_oil\_roubini\_bremmer?page=0,0, RSR]

Really, since 2008, if it's not been one thing, it's been something else. We no longer believe that there's meaningful likelihood that a shock is going to send the world back into recession. That's in part true because of the strengthening of American numbers. Nouriel's right, these are not exciting growth numbers -- this isn't the robust bounce-back that we think is going to power a global economy with the kind of figures you saw before the crisis, but it's a very different environment from the last four years. That's very important in terms of getting consumer confidence back, but it's also very important in terms of the orientation of CEOs to start spending some of the major cash that they've left off the table. I think the answer that they'll start doing it -- and not just in the United States. I don't want to say they're getting ebullient, but they're less fearful about medium and long-term trajectory.

#### Overproduction is already killing the industry – no chance at modeling.

Humes 2012

(Robert, Jul/August, “FRACTURED LIVES.”, Sierra, Vol. 97 Issue 4, p 52-59, 8p) PY

THE PROMISED ECONOMIC BENEFITS of the shale boom are no less murky. Overproduction of shale gas, which now accounts for more than 30 percent of domestic natural gas production, has pushed the price of a million BTUs down to $2.50 as of spring 2012; in July 2008, before the boom drove down prices, they spiked as high as $13.68. This is great for consumers, but it's breaking the drillers' backs; prices that low can't cover the $7.6 million average cost of fracking a single well. The result is that some drillers in Pennsylvania's "dry gas" (i.e., methane-only) areas -- notably giant Chesapeake Energy -- are pulling out and heading for honeypot wet-gas leases in Ohio. The industry is also pushing to expand export facilities for sending liquefied natural gas to more-lucrative foreign markets. Doing so is good for the corporate bottom line but punctures the argument that rapid and lightly regulated shale gas drilling will lead to energy independence.¶ That argument took another hit when the initial sky-high estimates of the amount of gas in the Marcellus Shale were cut by two-thirds in the U.S. Department of Energy's January 2012 analysis. And the industry's claim of a 100-year supply -- touted by President Obama in this year's State of the Union address -- is based on counting not just known and technically recoverable reserves but also estimates of gas reserves that are variously termed "probable," "possible," and "speculative" -- which means they are neither proven to exist nor known to be recoverable. What the U.S. Energy Information Administration calls "proven reserves" will yield a supply that will last only 11 years at current rates of consumption; add in "probable" reserves and the supply could last an additional 10.

#### Too long to solve for econ – prices not competitive

Peltier 2010

(Robert, May 2010, “Bridge to a Dead End.”, Power, Vol. 154 Issue 5, p6, 1p) PY

The report, "Prospects for Natural Gas Under Climate Policy Legislation," authored by Steven H. Levine, Frank C. Graves, and Metin Celebi, examines the role that natural gas might play as a "bridge" fuel that would link today's mix of power-generating resources to a future mix of nuclear power, coal plants with carbon capture and sequestration, and renewable energy sources. In this scenario, when the cost of carbon allowances (in a carbon-regulated economy) rises high enough, generators will migrate to the cheaper (both in carbon emissions and price) and more-plentiful natural gas, which will spur coal-to-gas plant conversions as an interim carbon reduction step until new low-carbon-technology plants can be built. For proponents of a carbon-reduced future, the price of carbon allowances determines the time it takes to cross the "bridge."¶ There are two major problems with this scenario. First, the cost of allowances, the amortized capital cost of converting coal plants to burn natural gas, higher fuel costs, and fuel volatility risk will always flow to the ratepayers in terms of increased electricity prices. Proponents are quick to forget that the price of natural gas has historically been volatile and unpredictable (gas prices at the Henry Hub pushed $15/mmBtu several times in 2005; today the price is less than $4). The second problem is that plant efficiency post-fuel-switch will be much less than that of a modern combined-cycle plant (never mind the myriad technical problems to make the fuel switch and the price of lost capacity during an outage). This will push a baseload coal plant from first place to an also-ran in the dispatch order, again pushing up electricity rates.¶ Controlling Carbon Prices¶ The authors, quite rightly, point out that carbon allowance prices will surely take more than a decade to rise high enough to make the fuel switch attractive, given the damping effect that rapidly rising electricity costs would have on our economy. Let's take a quick look at the authors' assumptions of what economic conditions must exist for fuel switching to occur.¶ First, compare an "inefficient" coal plant (14,000 Btu/kWh) burning coal fuel at $1.70/million Btu to an "efficient" gas-fired combined-cycle plant (7,000 Btu/kWh) firing natural gas at $6/million Btu. The "break even" point is a carbon allowance price of $10/ton. If the carbon allowance price increases, then conceptually the coal plant will move down the dispatch order but normally remain well above a gas plant. If the coal plant is "efficient" (9,000 Btu/kWh) then the break-even point climbs to $80/ton. The authors note, "Thus, coal is not thoroughly displaced by gas until CO2 prices are in the range of $50-$100/ton, levels that may not be observed (per EIA forecasts) until 2030 or later." There are numerous caveats to this rather simplistic analysis, but the relative values are illustrative of the senseless economics (at least from the viewpoint of a ratepayer) even in a carbon-constrained economy.¶

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war – no causal connection

Thomas P.M. Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis” http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts.

Fettweis, Department of Political Science at Tulane University, ‘11

[Christopher, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO]

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### **No IL to acid rain impacts. No reason why the acid rain from coal destroys ALL of freshwater.**

#### Their McKenzie evidence is not qualified from “geocities.com” and has no warrant. Also, no reason why plan solves for the ENTIRETY of acid rain.

#### **Transition to coal is net better for the environment – less emissions.**

Wigley 11 (Tom, October, “Coal to gas: the influence of methane leakage.”, Climatic Change, Vol. 108, Issue 3, p 601-608) PY

Figure 3 shows the sensitivity of the temperature differential to the assumed leakage¶ rate. The CO2 and aerosol terms are independent of the assumed leakage rate, so we only¶ show the methane and total-effect results. These results are qualitatively similar to those¶ of Hayhoe et al. who considered only a single leakage rate case (corresponding¶ approximately to our 2.5% leakage case). For leakage rates of more than 2%, the methane¶ leakage contribution is positive (i.e., replacing coal by gas produces higher methane¶ concentrations) — see the “CH4 COMPONENT” curves in Fig. 3. Depending on leakage¶ rate, replacing coal by gas leads, not to cooling, but to additional warming out to between¶ 2,050 and 2,140. Initially, this is due mainly to the influence of SO2 emissions changes,¶ with the effects of CH4 leakage becoming more important over time. Even with zero¶ leakage from gas production, however, the cooling that eventually arises from the coal-togas¶ transition is only a few tenths of a degC (greater for greater climate sensitivity — see¶ Electronic Supplementary Material). Using climate amelioration as an argument for the transition is, at best, a very weak argument, as noted by Hayhoe et al. (2002), Howarth et¶ al. (2011) and others.¶ In summary, our results show that the substitution of gas for coal as an energy¶ source results in increased rather than decreased global warming for many decades —¶ out to the mid 22nd century for the 10% leakage case. This is in accord with Hayhoe¶ et al. (2002) and with the less well established claims of Howarth et al. (2011) who base¶ their analysis on Global Warming Potentials rather than direct modeling of the climate.¶ Our results are critically sensitive to the assumed leakage rate. In our analysis, the¶ warming results from two effects: the reduction in SO2 emissions that occurs due to¶ reduced coal combustion; and the potentially greater leakage of methane that¶ accompanies new gas production relative to coal. The first effect is in accord with¶ Hayhoe et al. In Hayhoe et al., however, the methane effect is in the opposite direction to¶ our result (albeit very small). This is because our analyses use more recent information on¶ gas leakage from coal mines and gas production, with greater leakage from the latter. The¶ effect of methane leakage from gas production in our analyses is, nevertheless, small and¶ less than implied by Howarth et al.

### Warming

#### Too late for the natural gas bridge

**Romm 2012** (Joe Romm, Fellow at American Progress, April 9, 2012, “Natural Gas Is A Bridge To Nowhere Absent A Carbon Price AND Strong Standards To Reduce Methane Leakage,” Think Progress, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/04/09/460384/natural-gas-is-a-bridge-to-nowhere-absent-a-carbon-price-and-strong-standards-to-reduce-methane-leakage/)

The concept of natural gas as a “bridge fuel” was pushed by the American Gas Association as far back as 1981. It’s the longest bridge in history! Heck, the Golden Gate Bridge only took 4 years to build! But the window where gas can be a major bridge fuel to a world with a livable climate appears to be almost completely closed, now. Had we acted back in the 1980s or even 1990s as climate scientists and world leaders had been urging, then, yes, an expansion of gas use might have made sense. The fact that natural gas is now a bridge fuel to nowhere was first shown by the International Energy Agency in its big June report on gas — see IEA’s “Golden Age of Gas Scenario” Leads to More Than 6°F Warming and Out-of-Control Climate Change. The IEA’s well-named GAG scenario assumes that not only does oil production peak in 2020 — but so does coal! Remember, warming beyond 6°F (3.5°C) is “incompatible with organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation’, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems & has a high probability of not being stable (i.e. 4°C [7F] would be an interim temperature on the way to a much higher equilibrium level),” according to Professor Kevin Anderson, director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change in Britain (see here). We would be self-destructively irrational to risk even 5°F warming. If your goal is a livable climate, we need to transition off of all fossil fuels ASAP.

#### Best modles prove it undercuts renewables transition.

Inman 12 (Mason Inman, January 17, 2012, “Shale Gas: A Boon That Could Stunt Alternatives, Study Says,” http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/01/120117-shale-gas-boom-impact-on-renewables/)

Shale gas has transformed the U.S. energy landscape in the past several years—but it may crowd out renewable energy and other ways of cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, a new study warns. A team of researchers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology used economic modeling to show that new abundant natural gas is likely to have a far more complex impact on the energy scene than is generally assumed. If climate policy continues to play out in the United States with a relatively weak set of measures to control emissions, the new gas source will lead to lower gas and electricity prices, and total energy use will be higher in 2050. Absent the shale supply, the United States could have expected to see GHG emissions 2 percent below 2005 levels by 2050 under this relatively weak policy. But the lower gas prices under the current shale gas outlook will stimulate economic growth, leading GHG emissions to increase by 13 percent over 2005. And the shale gas will retard the growth of renewable energy's share of electricity, and push off the development of carbon capture and storage technology, needed to meet more ambitious policy targets, by as long as two decades. "Shale gas is a great advantage to the U.S. in the short term, for the next few decades," said MIT economist Henry Jacoby, lead author of the new study. "But it is so attractive that it threatens other energy sources we ultimately will need."

#### Methane from fracking causes warming

Vergano 2009V**Vergano 2009** (Dan Vergano is a science reporter and columnist at USA Today, where he has been on staff since 1999. Previous reporting stints were at Medical Tribune and HealthWeek, as well as the science intern slot at Science News, freelance work for Men's Health, New Scientist, Science, the Washington Post and others. Prior to his journalism career, Dan worked as a space policy analyst for a federally-funded research and development contract organization, “Methane's role in global warming underestimated”

http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2009-10-29-methane-global-warming\_N.htm)

Greenhouse gas calculations blame carbon dioxide too much for global warming, and methane too little, suggest researchers Thursday. In the journal Science, a team led by Drew Shindell of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York finds that chemical interactions between greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide cause more global warming than previously estimated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other efforts. "The total amount of warming doesn't change, just the balance of gasses behind it," Shindell says. The world's climate warmed an average about 1.3 degrees Fahrenheit from 1906 to 2005, very likely due to industrial greenhouse gases, the IPCC concluded in 2007, adding that carbon dioxide is "most important" greenhouse gas. Methane is a greenhouse gas produced by landfills, agriculture and some industries. In the study, Shindell and colleagues added chemical interactions between aerosols and greenhouse gases such as methane and carbon monoxide to a century-long model of climate change. They wanted to see the effects on each gas's "Global Warming Potential," or individual contribution to global warming. Methane played a bigger role than expected, suggesting that climate treaties such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol need to consider it more carefully, the study says. Greenhouse gases are transparent to sunlight, but retain heat in the atmosphere, raising global average temperatures. Burning fossil fuels, deforestation and other human activities have raised greenhouse gas levels to historic values in the last three centuries. "There is no way, other than aggressive geoengineering, to come close to meeting the world leaders’ goal of overall warming not exceeding (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial (levels) without focusing on BOTH carbon dioxide and non-carbon dioxide emissions," says Michael MacCracken of the Climate Institute, by email. "This is not an either-or choice — we must do both to have any chance at all." Because non-carbon dioxide gasses also cause air pollution, MacCracken and Shindell both suggest that politicians may embrace limiting those emissions in developing nations more quickly than carbon dioxide ones. China has about 750,000 air-quality-related deaths annually according to the World Health Organization, for example. In December, representatives of 192 nations head to Copenhagen to work on an international agreement to limit emissions. On the international front, "getting priorities right on the non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases has some real value," says MacCracken, a former Clinton-administration climate scientist. If negotiations keep stalling on carbon dioxide emissions debate, then "all of our efforts on the non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases won’t make much difference," he says. "There needs to be a deal and, in my view, cutting non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases and soot can be a helpful bridge to getting an agreement."

#### Can’t solve warming

#### A.) Deforestation

Howden 7(Daniel Howden, The Independent “Deforestation: The Hidden Cause of Global Warming” 14 May 2007. DOA August 15, 12 sphinx.tsf.hu/new/iny/files/1645.doc)

**Most people think of forests** only in terms of the CO2 they absorb. The rainforests of the Amazon, the Congo basin and Indonesia are thought of **as the lungs of the planet.** But **the destruction of those forests will in the next four years** alone, in the words of Sir Nicholas Stern, **pump more CO2 into the atmosphere than every flight in the history of aviation to at least 2025.¶** Indonesia became the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world last week. Following close behind is Brazil. Neither nation has heavy industry on a comparable scale with the EU, India or Russia and yet they comfortably outstrip all other countries, except the United States and China.¶ What both countries do have in common is tropical forest that is being cut and burned with staggering swiftness. Smoke stacks visible from space climb into the sky above both countries, while satellite images capture similar destruction from the Congo basin, across the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo.¶ According to the latest audited figures from 2003, **two billion tons of CO2 enters the atmosphere** every year **from deforestation.** That destruction amounts to 50 million acres - or an area the size of England, Wales and Scotland felled **annually.¶** The remaining standing forest is calculated to contain 1,000 billion tons of carbon, or double what is already in the atmosphere.¶ As the GCP's report concludes: **"If we lose forests, we lose the fight against climate change."**

#### B.) Live stock

FAO 6 ("Spotlight: Livestock Impacts on the Environment." FAO: FAO Home. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Nov. 2006. Web. 15 August 12. <<http://www.fao.org/ag/magazine/0612sp1.htm>>.)

The livestock sector is by far the single largest anthropogenic user of land. Grazing occupies 26 percent of the Earth's terrestrial surface, while feed crop production requires about a third of all arable land. Expansion of grazing land for livestock is a key factor in deforestation, especially in Latin America: some 70 percent of previously forested land in the Amazon is used as pasture, and feed crops cover a large part of the reminder. About 70 percent of all grazing land in dry areas is considered degraded, mostly because of overgrazing, compaction and erosion attributable to livestock activity.¶ At the same time, the livestock sector has assumed an often unrecognized role in global warming. Using a methodology that considered the entire commodity chain *(see box below)*, FAO estimated that livestock are responsible for 18 percent of greenhouse gas emissions, a bigger share than that of transport. It accounts for nine percent of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions, most of it due to expansion of pastures and arable land for feed crops. It generates even bigger shares of emissions of other gases with greater potential to warm the atmosphere: as much as 37 percent of anthropogenic methane, mostly from enteric fermentation by ruminants, and 65 percent of anthropogenic nitrous oxide, mostly from manure.

#### Can’t solve China, India, etc. No tech transfer – subsidies distort the market.

Hall and Helmers 10

[Bronwyn H. Hall, Professor of the Graduate School – UC Berkeley, Christian Helmers, University of Oxford - Department of Economics, The role of patent protection in (clean/green) technology transfer 24 October 2010 http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5706]

There are a number of other issues apart from intellectual property rights that are of first-order importance in setting incentives for the development and transfer of technologies. Developing countries themselves may generate powerful distortions inhibiting the production and transfer of green technologies. A report by Copenhagen Economics (2009) suggests that subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels in some developing countries, such as Venezuela, Iran and Indonesia, may represent a significant barrier to the development and transfer of green technologies in these countries. Barton (2007) suggests that import tariffs on photo-voltaic and wind technology in place in India and China may also act as a barrier to technology development and transfer. In contrast, import tariffs and subsidies for biofuels in place in industrialised countries, above all the EU and US, are viewed as hampering the development of this industry in developing countries, such as Brazil (World Bank 2010). Such import barriers on green technologies represent a complex issue. Due to the environmental externality, it is desirable to have policy interventions in place in developed countries dedicated to market creation, such as subsidies, to promote demand for green technologies (Taylor 2008). From a political economy perspective, however, it is unclear to what extent developed economies are willing to subsidise demand for green technology produced abroad, in particular in large emerging economies.